1	IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT	
2	FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON	
3	ANITA NOELLE GREEN, an )	
4	individual, ) Plaintiff, )	Case No. 3:19-cv-02048-MO
5	v.	Case No. 3:13-CV-02040-NO
6	)	Tuno 16 2020
7	MISS UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,) a Nevada limited liability	·
8	corporation doing business as ) United States of America ) Pageants,	
9	Defendant. )	Portland, Oregon
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15	Oral Argument	
16	(By Videoconference)	
17	TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS	
18	BEFORE THE HONORABLE MICHAEL W. MOSMAN	
19	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE	
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(PROCEEDINGS)

(June 16, 2020, 9:43 a.m.)

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THE COURTROOM DEPUTY: We are here today in Case No. 3:19-cv-2048-MO, Green versus Miss United States of America, LLC.

Counsel, please state your name for the record.

MS. PAYNE: Shenoa Payne for plaintiff.

MR. KAEMPF: This is John Kaempf for defendant Miss United States of America.

THE COURT: Thank you both for being here and available today.

There are some nonconstitutional preliminary issues that I want to talk about first, and then we'll get to the two constitutional doctrines that have been briefed by the parties.

So first there are questions about what I can consider, and that includes the idea of incorporation by reference or not of Exhibits A, B, and C. And so my own tentative view, to start the discussion at least, or to start the case moving forward and get to the constitutional issues, is that it is appropriate for me to consider those for today's purposes. I'll bring that up later, because when we get to discussion of freedom of association, it's -- I'll give away the first point in advance, and that is that I'm seriously considering delaying resolution of that matter until we have

limited discovery, and then taking it up as a question at summary judgment, not motion to dismiss, in which case that would also resolve the issue of how I ought to consider Exhibits A, B, and C. So I don't need to hear more about that for today's purposes on considering A, B, and C.

The second is the statute of limitations issue. And so, again, I'll give you my tentative decision, and then I do have a question for plaintiff's counsel.

It does appear to me that even if the factual dispute

I have in front of me about the statute of limitations goes

defendant's way and otherwise limits some of the discrete

events or harms that can be considered, that at a minimum the

case goes forward on injunctive relief.

Do you have any contrary view about that, Mr. Kaempf?

MR. KAEMPF: No, Your Honor. That's basically our

position, and I'm glad that you bought up the separate nature

of the injunctive, because I was going to do that as well. So

agreed, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. And so with that in mind, since the case will go forward in any event, I'll also, on a better record at summary judgment, consider any other issues about the overall application of the statute to the nature of relief that can eventually be sought by plaintiff here.

Ms. Payne, I do have a question, just to make things simpler for us here. There is this fact dispute about the

Facebook screenshots in Exhibit Z -- Exhibit B as to whether they really did occur on December 7th or December 20th. Do you have a position on that today?

MS. PAYNE: I think that the exhibits show that they did occur on December 7th. We didn't have access to those at the time we filed the complaint because Ms. Smith had removed those from Facebook. And so we would concede that for -- if you're going to consider the Exhibits A through C, that it would establish the Facebook conversations did occur December 7th.

I don't know if you want argument on whether that should limit the plaintiff's claim to damages or injunctive relief at this time or whether you want to hear that later.

THE COURT: No, I'll take that up later. Thank you.

As I said, what I'm doing with the statute of limitations is waiting to resolve it formally. We know the case will go forward at least in part, and there's the open question then about whether it's purely an injunctive case or whether it includes the January application and return of the fees, et cetera, and we'll just deal with that later.

All right. The third issue is whether plaintiff properly alleged that the denial of her application was because of her gender identity. And that's a -- in one sense, that's a serious issue, in that I think the allegations are somewhat conclusory. In some cases, it's not at all clear how an

amended complaint would take care of that problem, and here, in my view, at least, it's abundantly clear how an amended complaint could take care of that problem rather easily. I think we could probably have an amended complaint that solves the problem by noon today.

So at the end I'll come back to that. I'm likely to require amendment in order to satisfy that demand, but I'm not going to defer talking about the issues today because I view the problem so readily solved.

So the last preliminary issue, and one that I'm obligated in the sort of chain -- the decision tree in this case, the hierarchy of analysis -- to take up first is whether -- what to do with the Oregon state constitutional argument.

And so that argument plays forward in the briefing on the merits, except for plaintiff's argument that I ought not to consider it because it's entirely derivative of the federal First Amendment argument, and derivative application of Oregon free speech in a case that also has First Amendment arguments has been frowned upon in Oregon courts.

I disagree that it's so derivative that it runs afoul of the principle that I've just described, and so I am going to consider it on the merits. I'm not going to hear argument about it because I think it does require, at a minimum, some thought about the free speech implications first. And my own

tentative view -- quite tentative at this point, but enough to form how we're going to go forward at oral argument -- is that the Oregon constitutional argument does not go defendant's way.

I bring that up only to say that because of that, it makes sense to consider the federal constitutional arguments. Otherwise, if I were highly confident that defendant would win under the Oregon Constitution, there would be no need to consider further arguments. But because I see it in a different way, I'm going to focus all of our attention today on the two federal constitutional arguments.

So I want to start with the free speech argument, and I'm going to get to my questions here in just a moment, but I'm going to tell you in advance that I'm going to be asking you a hypothetical. And I've struggled lately with attorneys and hypotheticals. I don't think I'm going to struggle today, because my impression from the briefing is that the two of you are adept at juggling ideas in constitutional cases, but I'll just tell you this. When I ask a hypothetical, you don't have to say, "Well, that's not my case," and "Reserving my arguments to the contrary," et cetera. I understand that when you answer my question, you're only answering a hypothetical.

And it's not quite a hypothetical. It actually just asks you to imagine a world in which *Hurley* hasn't happened yet. For reasons I will get to later, I think it will help us look at the case without *Hurley*, and then ask the question how

Hurley applies.

So since, Mr. Kaempf, you've devoted several pages to *Hurley*, don't worry, we're going to get to *Hurley* and how it applies, but I want to ask first how we might think about the case before we apply *Hurley*.

MR. KAEMPF: Your Honor, John Kaempf for the defendant. May I begin?

THE COURT: Well, I haven't -- I'm now on my first question, and so here we go.

MR. KAEMPF: Oh, no, I am sorry. You go ahead, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you.

So the first question is, under traditional First Amendment analysis, the first question is does the OPAA regulate speech or conduct on its face. We'll get to the question that's more the subject of all your briefing, but I'm assuming on that first question, which is the question we first ask in this line of cases that takes us towards *Spence* and *O'Brien* eventually, whether the OPAA regulates speech or conduct on its face. So that's not asking what relief plaintiff is seeking in this case, it's rather a step upward in the sort of telescopic decision tree here.

So, Mr. Kaempf, I'm assuming the answer to that question is agreed upon by all of us, that on its face the OPAA only regulates conduct. Do you agree?

MR. KAEMPF: Well, I would agree that what we're talking about today, Your Honor, is an as-applied challenge based on what's alleged in the complaint.

THE COURT: All right. So that's easy. The next question is the one you just raised, and that is as applied here, is the conduct being regulated -- that is, another way to think about it is the way you, Mr. Kaempf, framed it, and that is is what plaintiff is seeking here the regulation or enforcement of expressive conduct subject to First Amendment protection, or is it just conduct, not something in the First Amendment?

I'll start with you, Mr. Kaempf.

MR. KAEMPF: Your Honor, what we are seeking to do here is regulate our right to associate. That's a First Amendment right. And in the *Roberts v. Jaycees* case from the U.S. Supreme Court, the Court said, "The freedom of association plainly presupposes the freedom not to associate."

And then going from *Roberts*, you have the *Dale v. Boy Scouts* case, and in that case, the scoutmaster, you know from the brief, he was openly gay, and much like the plaintiff here, as is her First Amendment right, Mr. Dale was an open gay rights activist, like the plaintiff is a transgender activist. And the Court in *Dale v. Boy Scouts* held that the plaintiff could not force his inclusion into the Boy Scouts, which opposed the homosexual conduct, according to its statement of

values, and morally clean and straight and all of that. 1 2 So I know you --3 THE COURT: I'll pause you there for a moment. MR. KAEMPF: But I do think Boy Scouts and Dale is 4 5 very important again because of being an activist and the Boy 6 Scouts opposing homosexuality, and you cannot have a forced 7 inclusion. And that is exactly what the plaintiff is asking for 8 She admits in the complaint that my client's pageant is 9 10 a public platform, and wants to force my client to include her 11 message that is contrary to my client's, which is to empower biological natural-born females. 12 13 And also, Your Honor --14 THE COURT: Mr. Kaempf, can you hear me all right? 15 MR. KAEMPF: Yes. 16 THE COURT: All right. I need to pause you there for 17 a moment for two reasons. One, I know this is a little tricky, 18 but it's very helpful to the court reporter and me if you make 19 sure that when you're not speaking you're muting your computer. 20 Can you do that for me, each of you? 21 MR. KAEMPF: Oh, my computer is off. Certainly. 22 THE COURT: Right. So that's number one. 23 And then number two, I'm asking questions that take 24 us through the traditional First Amendment analysis for free 25 speech along the lines of Spence and O'Brien, and which will

eventually get to *Hurley*. So we're not in the same ballpark as *Dale* yet. I guess I'm not ready to hear about *Dale*.

I take it from your argument, though, that you -- and from your briefing that you are adamant on the point that what's being regulated here is expressive conduct; that the relief plaintiff --

MR. KAEMPF: Yes. And the First Amendment right of free association, which includes who to not associate with.

THE COURT: Well, one at a time. All right? We'll get to association, but it will only muddle your point if you try to join *O'Brien* and *Spence* on one hand and *Dale* together. We'll come to *Dale* later.

Fair enough?

MR. KAEMPF: Certainly, Your Honor.

I would also briefly mention -- I don't know if you'll view it as the same or not, but the *McDermott* case, the 2010 Ninth Circuit case, which holds that newspapers which are for profit, like my client, they have the First Amendment right to choose their writers and who submits op-eds in a for-profit situation. And, again, that also involves First Amendment rights of speech and association. So that's another important case separate from *Hurley* and *Dale*.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Ms. Payne, same question. Is the conduct being regulated here what you would call under traditional First

Amendment analysis expressive conduct?

MS. PAYNE: No, Your Honor. The defendant in its brief focuses on two expressive -- the content of its pageant, its mission or message that defendant asserts is promoting biological women is expressive content, and in selecting its contestants.

The first is not in the pleadings or in Exhibit A.

Defendant's mission or message, which we would not dispute is an important expressive content, is promoting women, promoting or uplifting women. That in itself could be expressive content, but it is not, as defendant says, promoting biological women or cisgender women, which I think is more appropriately described.

THE COURT: Can I pause you there for just a moment?

So that's an argument that there can be a message here that is expressive conduct.

MS. PAYNE: Correct.

THE COURT: But that nothing you're requesting by way of relief runs afoul of that message, right?

MS. PAYNE: Correct. And so our argument is that this Court doesn't even really need to decide whether there is expressive content because defendant can't show that anything plaintiff is asking for would interfere with that expressive content. So even if this Court were to decide that there is expressive content, it really doesn't need to decide that

either way because defendant can't show prong two, which is that what plaintiff is requesting would ever interfere with such expressive content.

So whether this Court decides there is or isn't really isn't going to decide this issue. It is whether what plaintiff is requesting is going to interfere with that expressive content. So we would concede that potentially there is expressive content here, it's just what plaintiff is asking for isn't going to interfere with what defendant has actually -- its message is actually put out to the public.

THE COURT: So I have to two questions about that, if I could ask. The first is not so much a question, I guess -- Well, it is. That argument you've just made about interference or not with the core message of a group is why you think your relief doesn't run afoul of First Amendment analysis, but why, say, a non-Native American applicant might run afoul of the message of a Native American pageant, right?

MS. PAYNE: That's absolutely correct.

THE COURT: And then, secondly, your argument does depend on the message that the pageant in our case is advancing, including -- well, not being limited to biological women. If the message were, in fact, hypothetically speaking, a pageant for biological women, then your client's application, in the same way as we just talked about with the Native American pageant, would have a different impact on that speech,

right?

MS. PAYNE: It would, but I just want to be clear that -- I mean, you don't want to talk about *Hurley* yet, but the law is very clear that the exclusion isn't message based. The exclusion here is only status based, and that's another reason why the defendant's argument fails, because this --

THE COURT: Well, before you make that argument, that's why I asked the question about the Native American pageant, because the --

MS. PAYNE: -- (indiscernible) the associational claim and the selection claim, why selection in itself is also not (indiscernible).

Also, there's nothing on the pleadings for the defendant prior to discovery that shows that it also exercises any sort of creative control over the selection of its contestants, which, you know, absent any sort of discovery or showing on the pleadings -- which defendant can't do -- it doesn't exercise any sort of creative control over the selection of its contestants, such that it needs to preserve the expressive content of its pageant in a way that defendant is arguing.

So I think there's --

THE COURT: Let me just get back to the Native

American pageant for a moment, because I was interested in your

answer there, and I think it helps me understand your position.

So we are just talking about the First Amendment free speech guarantee right now, not freedom of association. As I told Mr. Kaempf, we'll get to association in a minute.

So I thought your view was that your client doesn't interfere with the potentially creative expression of a pageant celebrating women, and conversely, if you have a pageant that's openly celebrating Native American women, that the admission of a non-Native American would interfere with that message.

That's your first point, right? Do you agree with that?

MS. PAYNE: Yeah, I would. I mean --

THE COURT: Just let me get a quick answer to that argument.

MS. PAYNE: (Indiscernible) the *Apilado* case out of Washington. I mean, they had an entire gay identity wrapped up in their softball league, and they really promoted the softball league around that gay identity. And so I think that --

THE COURT: Let me stop you there.

To your point that this doctrine really only matters if you're excluding based on message not status, I mean, what we're talking about with the Native American pageant -- it's a hypothetical but it actually exists -- is exclusion by status, right, not by message?

MS. PAYNE: Yes.

THE COURT: And so I guess I'm asking is it or is it not the case that you can run afoul of free speech protections

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if your exclusion is by status? You've suggested if the exclusion is by status, it can't possibly run afoul of First Amendment protection, but if you have a Native American pageant and you exclude by status anyone who is not Native American, you've also suggested that could run afoul of the First So how do you reconcile those? Amendment. I think we're getting into the free MS. PAYNE: association aspect versus the free speech, but I think the free speech is you have to exclude based on message not status. think --THE COURT: I'm going to pause you there. So when you told me that there could be a problem with a Native American pageant allowing, being forced to allow in a non-Native American, your answer was essentially grounded in the freedom of association not freedom of speech? MS. PAYNE: Right. Yes, I believe that's correct. THE COURT: And so you don't think, I take it, that there's a First Amendment issue involved in requiring -- excuse me, I shouldn't have said that. A free speech issue involved in requiring a Native American pageant to let in non-Native Americans? MS. PAYNE: Yes. And to the extent that I said otherwise earlier, I was then referring to freedom of association not freedom of speech.

THE COURT: And you have the same answer in our

pageant for allowing -- being required to allow in men who identify as men. Do you think that's only a freedom of association question or does it also run afoul of *Spence* and *O'Brien*?

MS. PAYNE: I think that would be a freedom of association issue not a freedom of speech issue. It would have to be based on message not status. I think when we get to freedom of association that we may have problems talking about freedom of association based on the core message of the pageant, and permitting men into the pageant would interfere with -- for associational reasons but has nothing to do with the message that the men are speaking. It has everything to do with who the men are and their status.

THE COURT: Well, I thought earlier your argument was certainly if you have a pageant that only allows in and celebrates the beauty of Native American women, and you're forced to allow in non-Native American women, that can interfere with the message, right? I thought your point was just that too bad, because we don't protect exclusions based on status as opposed to message.

MS. PAYNE: So it's not just whether it interferes with the pageant message, because that -- you're saying that that forces the -- that somebody's status can force the pageant to speak a message. *Hurley* says otherwise. Cases that follow *Hurley* say otherwise, that someone's status cannot force

someone to speak a message. It has to be message based. *Klein* said otherwise, cases following *Klein*. If you look at *Elaine Photography* out of New Mexico, all these cases say if you try to exclude an entire group based on their status, that's not forcing someone to speak a message. It's the cake-baking cases. It's all these cases where you say you're not forcing someone to put a message on a cake, what you're doing is you're refusing service altogether. And so that's not forcing someone to change the expressive content of their expressive activity. You're just -- you're just forcing them to include someone in their services.

THE COURT: Thank you very much. I appreciate it.

Mr. Kaempf, so same sort of question. You said it's expressive conduct here, and how would you then -- again, we're just taking a minute here to talk about the case under traditional First Amendment analysis. So how would you apply the two -- the two cases you never really applied in your briefing, and that's *Spence* and *O'Brien*? How would they apply here if you had to apply them?

MR. KAEMPF: Well, the expressive conduct is stated in the preexisting rules that are not disputed and that are in the record that this is about empowering biological women and natural-born females, and in promoting, quote, sisterhood. And that is my client's right to promote that, and that's what its pageant has found. And then what we have is not a status issue

but someone who says, no, you must change that and now include me and my opposing view that transgender women are the same as biological women. That violates both our First Amendment, free exercise -- excuse me, free speech, as well as the right of association.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

So then how -- I'll start with you, Ms. Payne. How does *Hurley* change the analysis that would traditionally be engaged in under *O'Brien* and *Spence* here, if at all? What's your view on what *Hurley* did to preexisting free speech case law? Ms. Payne?

MS. PAYNE: Well, *Hurley* basically says that organizations can't be forced to speak a message or include somebody else's message that they disagree with. And our argument is that *Hurley* doesn't apply here, particularly because defendant rejected plaintiff without asking what plaintiff's message was, and it's excluding transgender women not based on any potential message that transgender women are potentially speaking. It's a status-based exclusion.

And Hurley expressly spoke about the fact that in Hurley, LGBT people were allowed to participate in the parade, and that it wasn't an across-the-board status exclusion but it was based on the fact that this particular LGBT group was carrying a banner and celebrating the -- their LGBT status as an Irish pride LGBT person, and that that was against what the

parade providers were -- it was against their core message, and the parade providers didn't want to carry that message as part of the parade.

THE COURT: All right. Can I pause you there for a moment? I'd like to restate your argument just to see if I have it right.

MS. PAYNE: Perfect.

THE COURT: So I think you're saying that Hurley starts with the overall question, you know, about public accommodations laws, but ends up saying that they don't -- that public accommodations laws, in terms of what was being sought for relief in Hurley, simply didn't apply; that is, that people could join the parade, there was no limitation on participation based on status, and that somewhere along the way the enforcement of the law on the particular facts in Hurley had resulted in the direct regulation by state statute of speech. In fact, it had resulted in compelling speech. But that without that, without that sort of set of facts that take the case outside of public accommodations laws, Hurley doesn't necessarily apply. Is that your argument?

MS. PAYNE: That's correct.

THE COURT: And then I do want to ask, your complaint suggests that plaintiff's participation in the pageant is driven by a desire to share a message. How does that bring or not bring this case within *Hurley*?

MS. PAYNE: Because her message is not LGBT based. It's not transgender based. It's not any different message than any other participant would share. It's to be an example, to -- to be a positive example, and that's exactly consistent with what defendant's message is, to promote all women, and that's what plaintiff's message is, to promote women. So unlike the individual in *Hurley* who wanted to carry a banner promoting (indiscernible) message, plaintiff has not stated that she's going to have a message promoting transgender women or LGBT issues, and that's also not what plaintiff has said that her message is going to be. And so her message is absolutely consistent with defendant's stated mission.

THE COURT: Thank you.

So does that mean that for, again, for First

Amendment free speech implication only, not freedom of
association, that a biological male applicant who wanted to
promote women and be consistent with the message of this
pageant, under Oregon's public accommodation law, would be
required to be allowed to enter the pageant?

MS. PAYNE: Well, I dispute calling my client a biological male.

THE COURT: No, I didn't. That wasn't my question at all.

MS. PAYNE: Sorry, sorry.

THE COURT: I was asking about the implication of

your argument. Does your argument mean that if a biological male applicant wanted to join the pageant and step up and enhance the message of the pageant to further the cause of women, that the OPAA would require the pageant to allow him to enter, at least as against only a free speech challenge?

MS. PAYNE: On a free speech challenge only? I think so, on a free speech challenge only.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you very much.

Mr. Kaempf, same question. We talked about the -well, actually backing up to the original question, not the one
I just asked, we talked about the application of traditional
free speech cases. Now I'm asking you how did *Hurley* change
the landscape of that at all?

MR. KAEMPF: Sure.

And back to when you mentioned O'Brien, the traditional First Amendment you talked about, as mentioned in our brief, what -- the relief plaintiff requests is not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling interest. And so it would fail under that as well under our brief.

The way that *Hurley* changed it is by making even more express what was first recognized by the United States Supreme Court in 1958, that the First Amendment also contains a right of free association, and further *Hurley* held -- as you know, that was the GLIB, the LGBTQ group that this Boston Veterans Council, in the St. Patrick's Day Parade, they could not be

forced to include their banner because that freedom to association, recognized in 1958 -- and *Hurley* amplified it also -- included the freedom not to associate, as stated in the 1984 Roberts opinion.

So I would submit that we would win on this even if Hurley didn't exist under the prior O'Brien analysis, but Hurley and then Dale I think really is the end of plaintiff's case on the First Amendment issue because of both free speech and free expression and the right to not associate.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. KAEMPF: Your Honor, to something that Ms. Payne just said. She said, you know, this contest is to promote women, but, you know, she skips over the key point, which is that it's undisputed from her allegations in the exhibits we're allowed to incorporate that we only promote biological women, natural-born females. That's not a small business. That's the heart of it.

And I would also mention that the very fact that we're having this lawsuit proves our free association point. Plaintiff admits that she wants a, quote, platform for her view of what it means to be a woman and all that, and she went out and sought a bunch of media attention locally and nationally. And that's exactly our point. Her position is unless you agree with me and I am ordered by the Court, I'm going to be included in your pageant. If you don't do that, you're going to be

punished through some big damages and attorney fees.

So the fact that we're here and all the media attention is exactly why we have *Hurley* and *Dale* holding no, with respect, you cannot do that. You can be an activist but there are other pageants like Ms. Universe that you can go to but not ours.

And I think it's important to point out that the point of the First Amendment is that we have a diversity of opinions. No one is attacking the plaintiff for being transgender, but we have competing opinions. That's what the First Amendment is about. And what they want is, she says, I get to speak what I want, but you, defendant, don't get to have your unique message. That is not allowed because the First Amendment is a two-way street.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you very much.

I want to turn to the freedom of association. And the first question really is whether the pageant here is or is not an expressive association. I'm going to ask a question that won't require you to cite a lot of facts, but rather it will ask you to tell me a methodology.

So my question is what is the test or the method in the case law determining whether a group is an expressive association or not? What's the test?

I'll start with you, Ms. Payne.

MS. PAYNE: Well, thank you, Your Honor, for pointing

out to the *IDK* case. I think the test is actually a little squishy, and it's not exactly clear, and it does rely on a lot of facts as to whether an organization is expressive versus commercial, for instance. And it does depend on a lot of facts, and I think Your Honor made a good point by sending us a lot of questions about how an organization, for instance, generates revenue and expresses contestants' views, but I think that even the Ninth Circuit case, it cited to a Supreme Court case, which I'm sorry, I'm blanking on right now as to, you know, that it's not always easy to tell.

And this is one of the reasons why I asked for discovery in this case, because I think that, for instance, in this case, there are certain aspects of this pageant cited in Defendant's Exhibit A that involve a personal interview and an on-stage question that could be considered expressive, but I don't -- I haven't had the opportunity to explore what those entail, and it's really unclear at this point what those are.

And as I cited in my brief, you know, pageants have been considered expressive before, but they had talent portions, so this pageant doesn't appear to have a talent portion, but it's really unclear what -- it's kind of like you know it when you see it, it seems to be how the cases seem to treat what is truly expressive versus not expressive. And I don't know that there's a particular test, but cases seem to say, you know, art and TV shows are expressive, and I don't

know that this pageant really reaches that kind of expressive activity, but surely on the face of the pleadings, I don't know that you can reach that.

And as I stated before, I don't know that this Court needs to decide that issue because there is no interference with that expressive activity, even if this Court were to decide it were expressive activity, but I think that the questions that the Court sent us as to whether this particular pageant is inherently expressive certainly can't be decided on the face of the pleadings, and discovery is needed to determine that question.

THE COURT: So if I can summarize briefly, you're telling me first that there is no identifiable test?

MS. PAYNE: I don't think so, not that I can tell from the cases, and it seems to be that courts seem to say that you know it when you see it.

THE COURT: You know, I've heard Potter Stewart saying he's hated ever having that quoted back at him, so I'm reluctant to use it to decide a case.

Secondly, if I do order discovery, I'm ordering discovery without knowing what its limits are because I don't know what it is that you're supposed to go discover.

What would be the limits of discovery if there's no identifiable test? What would you want to go discover?

MS. PAYNE: Well, particularly I think one of the

questions that I wanted discovery on in my declaration, as I think is important to this Court, is whether any sort of expressive activity is actually defendant's expressive activity or the contestant's expressive activity. I think that's an important question for this Court, and something that this Court asked us to answer today during oral argument is whether the -- whether defendant actually has any sort of disclaimer to the public that the contestants or individuals that are competing against each other, whether, you know, during their personal interview and when they're asking a question on stage, whether that is their own individual expression or whether that is defendant's expression.

THE COURT: So you suggested that I don't need to care about this answer too much because even if it is an expressive association, there's nothing about what plaintiff is seeking by way of relief that affects the association's ability to express its viewpoint.

That gets us back, doesn't it, to the sort of definitional argument you're making that if you define women in the way that your case defines it, then there's no impact on their message, but if defendants define women the way they assert they want to define it, wouldn't you agree that it would impact their message -- excuse me, their association?

MS. PAYNE: Yes, but I -- again, I want to be very clear that -- and case law is very clear that a discriminatory

membership policy, *Roberts* says this and the Oregon Supreme Court has said this in *Lahmann* -- or I think it was the court of appeals -- excuse me -- in *Lahmann* that a discriminatory membership policy in and of itself cannot serve as expressive content or conduct and cannot be the basis for a freedom of association claim. And so that's all that defendant has is a discriminatory membership policy.

THE COURT: If I'm agreeing that it's an expressive association, then the next step is to sort of get at what they're expressing, right, what their message is? Doesn't Dale suggest that I should show deference to the organization's own statement about what its message is?

MS. PAYNE: Not when the statement is contradicted by their own -- by their own Exhibit A and their own website and by their own information that they're attributing to the public, which they're basically silent on anything regarding transgender women, cisgender women. What they say is that their goal is to promote women and uplift everyone, that the idea of ethnicity and beauty is what lies within, and what they're saying to the public is contrary to what they say that their message is. Their only message lies in a policy, and what the Fair (ph) case says is just because discrimination is written down does not make it expressive conduct.

THE COURT: Thank you very much.

Mr. Kaempf, same question. By what test do I

determine whether your client is an expressive association or not?

and Hurley, which is the basically are you requiring us to at least expressively endorse a message that is contrary to our own. And here it's even more express than in Dale. They just wanted to silently march, but this plaintiff wants to compete as a transgender female. And so I would look to Hurley and Dale, and again in Dale the issue was, okay, you are an open homosexual activist, that's your right, but the Boy Scouts does not support homosexuality or the lifestyle, as they call it in the case. That's test I would look to from Dale and Hurley.

I would also point out that Ms. Payne just said, well, the defendant is silent about the issue of what it is to be a woman. That's not true. Her complaint says -- and then it's confirmed by the website that you can incorporate, that the pageant is for biological natural-born females. So we are not silent about that issue.

The other point I would note is that in *Hurley* the Court noted, kind of chiding the veterans parade, saying, you know, what they're doing, what their message is is barely articulated. But it's a little more. And I think ours is a lot more than barely articulated, which was enough in *Hurley*. We support biological natural-born females, and we want to promote sisterhood, and that is our definition of what it means

to be a woman.

And, again, we're not attacking the plaintiff personally for disagreeing, we're just saying that under the First Amendment, we get the right to believe that, and she cannot be forced into our pageant. And she does carry our message, like in the *Claybrooks* case, for example, when they talked about who a TV station hires to be an anchor, because Ms. Payne is trying to say, oh, it's really just the contestants that are giving the message. No, not when you say in your complaint that you want to use our "platform" to say that, then you are contradicting and making a message through the Miss United States of America Pageant. So you can't just slice it off that way.

And it's also like when we talk about the cases that we mentioned, *McDermott* from 2010 from the Ninth Circuit, a newspaper, the people -- the writer that chooses -- sure, they're the speaker, but they are carrying the defendant's message, like someone who submits an op-ed, and that is subject to First Amendment protection.

So I think that that's important to note that we're not silent, we're expressly --

THE COURT: Mr. Kaempf. Mr. Kaempf.

MR. KAEMPF: -- biological natural-born females.

And I also wanted to point out, Your Honor, on what is expression. We cited to you in the brief the Norma Kristie

case. That was the gay pageant, where it was men dressing up as women, I believe gay men, and that was their pageant. And, again, that's their right. That's their First Amendment right. But in that case, in *Norma Kristie*, the Court recognized that that is expression.

And so in our pageant as well, although it is the other side of the coin in First Amendment law, it is a pageant that says no, only natural-born biological females.

So when you look at *Claybrooks* and *Norma Kristie* and the *McDermott* opinion and *Hurley* and *Hale -- Dale*, excuse me, you've got that expressive conduct and the right of association all around.

And, again, we are not attacking her personally. She can do what she likes in all these other contests -- she won the other contest in Oregon. And, again, we don't dispute that Ms. Universe allows transgender females, but we do not, and that's our right. And as in *Dale* and *Hurley* we, with respect, ask that you not force us to include the plaintiff, because under *Dale* and *Hurley*, this is not new ground, this is why they published the cases, and you cannot force this person to be included in our group. That violates the fundamental right of free association.

Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Yeah, I need you to take a breath every now and then

so I can quide the discussion a little better.

So I am going to send this case forward on limited discovery to summary judgment, and the limited discovery will be on the question of expressive association. And so the parties will explore, as they see appropriate, the information they think is necessary to better answer at the summary judgment stage whether this is or is not an expressive association.

I am limiting discovery at this point to written discovery. I'm not allowing depositions. I don't think they will ever be necessary, but you'll have to at least start with the typical written discovery to make the case later if you actually think some sort of deposition will become necessary, and I'll consider that.

So on the idea that this can be resolved on written discovery and then repositioned as a motion for summary judgment, but limited in its factual development to this question of expressive association, how long do the parties think they need? I was thinking something on the order of 90 days.

Mr. Kaempf, what do you think?

MR. KAEMPF: Ninety days is fine, Your Honor. We can make that work.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Ms. Payne?

MS. PAYNE: Yes, 90 days is fine.

THE COURT: So 90 days is when I'm saying discovery would wrap up and you would replead it as summary judgment.

You can rely on your briefing that you've given me already and just supplement it with what you think the facts you've learned mean in the context of summary judgment.

The other thing, of course, that will happen in 90 days is that instead of a big question about whether I ought to incorporate by reference Exhibits A, B, and C, you can inquire into them and authenticate them, and they'll become actual exhibits for summary judgment.

I want to ask -- and I'll start with you,

Ms. Payne -- whether you see for the limited purpose of

resolving these constitutional questions any other issue that

you believe firmly needs further factual development, not to

win on the merits but just to resolve these two constitutional

issues.

MS. PAYNE: Well, I'm sorry, can you -- are there other factual issues other than Exhibits A, B, and C, or other factual issues that would be needed outside of the written discovery that you've allowed?

THE COURT: Thank you.

What I'm allowing is limited discovery, limited both by topic and by method -- that is, by topic it's on expressive association, and on method it's on written discovery, so that

we can move to summary judgment on largely the same record that we have, but an expanded factual record and a different procedural posture on the question before me.

So I've limited it to the issue of expressive association. Is there another issue on these constitutional questions that you think requires more factual development than -- to resolve it?

MS. PAYNE: And so when you say limiting to expressive association, are you limiting discovery to whether the pageant is an expressive association, not on the overall issue of freedom of association?

THE COURT: The former. I'm limiting it to whether the pageant is or is not an expressive association. Do you see any other issue that requires some sort of similar limited brief factual development?

Let me do this, Ms. Payne. I'll give you 24 hours to think about that. You'll submit an email to the Court if you think there's some other issue that in the 90-day window we're opening up here requires further factual development.

How about you, Mr. Kaempf? Any other issue you think requires limited factual development?

MR. KAEMPF: Well, our position, Your Honor, would be that we don't think there's any discovery, but of course we respect what you just ruled on the 90 days, limited to the freedom of expression.

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THE COURT:

If I could, Judge, will we also push anti-SLAPP down Because I don't want to launch into that if you don't want to hear that today. Correct. THE COURT: MR. KAEMPF: Okay. And then I would just also mention briefly, if I could, counsel brought up the IDK v. Clark County case. THE COURT: I don't need to hear more about that right now. MR. KAEMPF: You do not. Okay. That is just fine. Your Honor --THE COURT: In 90 days you'll submit further briefing, and again keep in mind you don't need to redo an entire summary judgment brief. You can, if you choose to, but you can also just rely on what you've briefed. And then tell me by way of briefing, simultaneous briefing in 90 days --Well, actually let's do this. Mr. Kaempf, it's going to be your motion for summary judgment, so in 90 days you'll file your motion for summary judgment, and you'll be able to rely on Exhibits A, B, and C, and any facts that you think help you on the question of expressive association. And according to the normal rules, Ms. Payne, you'll respond, and Mr. Kaempf, you'll reply. MR. KAEMPF: Thank you, Your Honor. The initial brief will be due in 90 days,

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and then we'll take it from there.
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               MR. KAEMPF: Thank you, Judge.
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               THE COURT: And the parties will engage over the next
     90 days in the limited written discovery that I mentioned a
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     moment ago, no depositions.
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               MR. KAEMPF: Okay.
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               THE COURT: All right. Thank you.
               MR. KAEMPF: Thank you, Your Honor. Thank you very
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     much.
               THE COURT: Good day.
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               (Proceedings concluded at 10:39 a.m.)
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--000--I certify, by signing below, that the foregoing is a correct transcript of the record of proceedings in the above-entitled cause. A transcript without an original signature or conformed signature is not certified. /s/Bonita J. Shumway June 30, 2020 BONITA J. SHUMWAY, CSR, RMR, CRR DATE Official Court Reporter 

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